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This paper studies firmsÕ incentives to invest in environmental R&D under different market
structures (Cournot and Bertrand) and environmental policy instruments (emission
standards, taxes, tradable permits and auctioned permits). Because of market strategic effects,
R&D incentives vary widely across market structures and instruments. For example, when
firmsÕ products are strategic substitutes (i.e., Cournot), either emission standards, taxes or
auctioned permits can provide the most incentives. But when firmsÕ products are strategic
complements, either taxes or auctioned permits provide the most incentives. If markets are
perfectly competitive, however, permits and emission standards offer similar incentives
that are lower than those offered by taxes.
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I. Introduction
The relationship between market structure and technical progress has
attracted significant attention from economists over the last decades. Motivated
by the notion that technical progress is perhaps the main vehicle to solve
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environmental problems in the long-run (Kneese and Schultze, 1978),
economists have also focused on the extent to which different environmental
policy instruments provide firms with incentives to invest in environmental
R&D. This latter work has been carried out under the assumption of perfect
competition, abstracting from market structure considerations (Tietenberg,
1985; Milliman and Prince, 1989; Jung et al., 1996; Requate, 1998; and Parry,
1999).1In general, authors have found that market-based regulatory
instruments such as taxes, tradable permits and auctioned permits provide
more R&D incentives than command-and-control instruments such as emission
standards.2
In this paper, I extend the study of firmsÕ incentives to invest in
environmental R&D by considering the possibility of imperfect competition
in output and permit markets. Since real-world markets are rarely perfectly
competitive, extending the environmental innovation literature to allow for
imperfect competition can have important policy implications. In fact, the
industrial organization literature has shown that strategic or market interactions
in oligopoly markets can significantly affect Òinvestment decisions,Ó including
cost-reducing R&D (Brander and Spencer, 1983; Spence, 1984; Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1984; and Bulow et al., 1985). Depending on the market structure,
some firms may have incentives to overinvest while others may have incentives
to underinvest. While it is likely that these strategic interactions also affect
1 One exception is Biglaiser and Horotiwz (1995) that consider firms interaction in the
market for the discovery of new pollution-control technologies and assume perfect
competition in the output market. While they focus on the optimal design of a technology
standard coupled with a tax, in this paper I focus on the comparison among individual
instruments.
2 Less consistent with the above findings are the works of Magat (1978) and Malueg (1989),
who showed that relative incentives may vary depending on firmÕs specific technologies
and elements of instrument design. Laffont and Tirole (1996) have also shown that plain
tradable permits may offer little R&D incentives, but the introduction of advance permits
and options can restore these incentives. However, they did not compare permits with
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firmsÕ incentives to invest in environmental R&D, it remains to be seen whether
the changes in incentives significantly affect the Òenvironmental R&D
rankingsÓ found by previous studies. It may well be that incentives under
market-based instruments are still greater (although different in magnitude
from the earlier findings) than they are under command-and-control
instruments.
To study the effect of imperfect competition on environmental R&D, I
extend the model of Montero (2002) and have two firms (1 and 2) competing
in either quantities (i.e., Cournot competition) or prices (i.e., Bertrand
competition) in the output market and at the same time being subject to an
environmental regulation. The regulatory goal is to limit emissions at some
predetermined level by means of one of the following four regulatory
instruments: emission standards, taxes, (grandfathered) tradable permits and
auctioned permits. Firms can reduce their compliance costs and improve their
position in the output market by investing in environmental R&D.
As explained by Tirole (1988, pp. 323-336), in such a market-regulatory
setting, firm 1Õs incentive to invest in R&D results from two effects. The
direct or cost-minimizing effect accounts for that fraction of firm 1Õs cost
savings (or profit increase) that does not affect firm 2Õs choice of output. In
other words, this effect would exist even if firm 1Õs R&D investment were
not observed by firm 2 before the latter determined its output. The strategic
effect, on the other hand, results from the influence of firm 1Õs R&D investment
on firm 2Õs choice of output. For example, firm 2 may increase its output as
an optimal response to firm 1Õs R&D investment adversely affecting firm 1Õs
profits. Hence, it may be optimal for firm 1 to invest less in R&D in order to
avoid an aggressive response by firm 2 in the output market. The sign of this
strategic effect may be positive or negative depending on the market-regulatory
structure. Not surprisingly, after accounting for direct and strategic effects,
the results of this paper indicate that the ÒR&D rankingsÓ of instruments
differ in many ways from earlier findings. In fact, I find situations in which
standards offer greater R&D incentives than the other three instruments.
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basic model and explain how to estimate firmsÕ incentives to invest in
environmental R&D. In Section III, I assume that firms compete  la Cournot
in the output market and estimate R&D incentives under the four
aforementioned regulatory instruments. In Section IV, I repeat the analysis of
Section III but now assuming that firms compete  la Bertrand. In Section V,
I develop some numerical examples to illustrate and complement some of the
analytical results of the previous sections using the social optimum solution
as a benchmark. In Section VI, I discuss R&D under perfect competition and
provide concluding remarks.
II. The Model
Consider two profit-maximizing firms (denoted by i and j) competing
under different market and regulatory structures. When firms compete  la
Cournot in the output market (i.e., firmsÕ outputs are strategic substitutes),
the inverse demand function is P = P(Q), where P is the output market price
and Q = qi + qj is industry output. When firms compete  la Bertrand (i.e.,
firmsÕ outputs are strategic complements), the demand curve faced by firm i
is qi = Di(pi , pj), where pi is the price chosen by firm i.
Without loss of generality, firm i produces qi at no cost, and in the absence
of any regulation, production leads also to qi units of emission. Emissions can
be reduced at a total cost of C(ri), where ri is the amount of emissions reduced,
and, as usual,        and  . Ci 0 > ¢ ¢  It is convenient to re-write the abatement
function as Ci(qi Ð ei ), where qi Ð ei ¼ ri  and ei is firm iÕs emissions after
abatement. Thus, if the firm does not abate any pollution ei = qi.
The environmental regulatory structure consists of a goal and instrument.
I assume that the regulatory goal is to limit aggregate emissions at some level
j i e e E + = by means of one of the following four regulatory instruments:
emission standards, taxes, (grandfathered) tradable permits and auctioned
permits. Under emission standards, firmsÕ emissions are limited to  i e  and  j e
respectively, such that  i e  +  j e  =  . E  Under tax regulation, firms pay J dollars
for each unit of emissions. The tax level J is set based on the production
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technology, output demand, and current abatement technology (i.e., before
R&D) to yield  . E  Under permits regulation, a total number of E  permits are
either distributed freely or auctioned off. I assume that each instrument design
remains unchanged regardless the amount of R&D undertaken afterwards.
Alternatively, one could assume that the regulator is unable to observe R&D
investments or that observes them after a long time.
Firms engage in output competition taking into account R&D investments
that can reduce their environmental compliance costs, and hence, their ability
to compete in the market. Following Spence (1984), I assume that if firm i and
firm j invest in environmental R&D, abatement costs reduce from Ci(qi - ei )
to kiCi(qi - ei ), where ki is a R&D production function of the form,3
where Ki is firmÕs i R&D effort with a total cost of vi Ki,4 f(0) = 1, f(´) > 0,
fÕ < 0, fÕÕ > 0, and 0 # 2 # 1 is a parameter intended to capture possible
spillovers. If 2 = 0 there are no spillovers, while if 2 = 1 the benefits of
each firmÕs R&D efforts are fully shared.
Depending on the regulatory instrument, the solution of the model involves
either a two-period or three-period equilibrium. In the case of emission
standards and taxes there are two periods. First, the two firms choose R&D
levels Ki and Kj respectively, which are known to both firms, and then, actions
ai and aj (which can be either quantities or prices), and emission levels ei and
ej are simultaneously determined. In the case of permits, there are three periods.
) ( j i i i K K f k q + = (1)
3 This way of modeling innovation applies more naturally to production process innovation
at the firm. For example, under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments electric
utilities have been making ÒR&D effortsÓ to retrofit their boilers to burn different type of
coals and hence reduce their compliance costs.
4 Although one could simply treat Ki as dollars invested in R&D, this formulation facilitates
the numerical resolution of the model. Still, I will often use the words ÒR&D investmentÓ
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First, the two firms choose R&D investments Ki and Kj, then, emission levels
ei and ej (by the amount of permits withheld) and permits price F are
determined, and finally, actions ai  and aj  are resolved.5
To decide upon the amount of R&D to undertake, firms must have some
expectation about how the permits and output marketsÕ equilibria will be
resolved. I assume, that for any given level of R&D, firms have complete
information, and therefore, correctly anticipate the Nash equilibrium
afterwards, which is resolved either as a Cournot game or as a Bertrand game
with differentiated products. When the environmental regulation takes the
form of tradable or auctioned permits, I assume that for any given level of
R&D and expected output, firms Nash bargain over the permits price F (total
quantity is fixed at E). Since information is complete and there are no income
effects, the Nash bargaining solution leads to the efficient level of emissions
for any given level of investment (Ki  and Kj ) and expected actions (ai  and aj),
regardless the initial distribution of the tradable permits (Spulber, 1989).
The optimal amount of R&D to undertake by firm i under different market
and regulatory structures could be obtained from maximizing
, ) , ( i j i i vK K K - p  where  ) , ( j i i K K p represents firm iÕs profits resulting from
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the permits (if it is the case) and
output markets after observing R&D levels Ki and Kj. The solution Ki
* must
satisfy  , / ) , ( i i j i i v dK K K d = p where  i j i i dK K K d / ) , ( p  is the total
derivative of Bi with respect to Ki.
Rather than estimating Ki
* directly, however, in this paper I compare R&D
incentives from the total derivative of  ) , ( j i i K K p with respect to ki, that is
dBi /dki. Because Ki
* solves
5 Since permits can be considered as another input into the production process, it is natural
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fÕ < 0 and fÕÕ > 0, it is immediate that K* increases with Ð dBi /dki , regardless
the level of spillovers 2.6
Thus, if  i
A
i dk dp -  and  i
B
i dk dp -  are the total derivatives
corresponding to regulatory instruments A and B, respectively, we would have
that A leads to greater R&D than B does if                    >  i
B
i dk dp - for all ki.
If  i
A
i dk dp - >  i
B
i dk dp - for only some values of ki, however, we would
have that instrument A may lead to more, equal or less R&D than instrument
B depending on the value of market, regulatory, and R&D parameters. In this
situation, for example, one instrument can more effectively force drastic
innovations (big reductions in k) than the other instrument.
III. R&D under Cournot Competition
In this section, I solve the model and estimate the value of ÐdBi /dki for
each regulatory instrument when firms compete  la Cournot. I assume that
firms are symmetric in all respects, including their allocation of emission
standards and tradable permits.
A. Emission Standards
Under emission standards regulation and Cournot competition, for any
given a level of ki and kj (or Ki  and Kj), firm i maximizes profits
subject to  , i i e e £ where ei is the emission standard established for firm i and
Q = qi + qj. Setting  , i i e e = the second-period equilibrium is given by the
following first-order condition (FOC) for qi
6 Since k = f ((1+2)K), eq. (2) can be entirely written as a function of k as dB/dk = v/fÕ(f-1(k)),




i dk dp -
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The third term of (4) indicates that the environmental regulation rises marginal
production costs by an amount equal to marginal abatement cost at  , i i e e =
which depends on the amount of R&D undertaken.
The incentives to invest in R&D are obtained from the (negative) value of
the total derivative of (3) with respect to ki at the optimum level of output and
emissions. Using the envelope theorem, this derivative is equal to
The first term on the right-hand side (RHS) of (5) is the direct effect, which is
always positive and increasing with the amount of abatement qi Ð ei. Hence,
the tighter the standard (i.e., the lower e  becomes) the higher the direct
incentives.
The second term on the RHS of (5) is the strategic effect. This effect
results from the influence of R&D investment on firm jÕs second period action.
Since PÕ < 0, its sign depends on the sign of dqj /dki. In this emission-standards-
Cournot game, environmental R&D can be interpreted as pure cost-reducing
innovation, and therefore we should expect that dqj /dki > 0. The implication
is that a lower ki, which means lower marginal abatement costs ki CiÕ, raises
firm jÕs relative costs reducing its output. This interaction in the output market
results in a positive strategic effect, leading to more R&D than otherwise.
Obtaining an expression for dqj /dki (see Appendix A), eq. (5) becomes
Assuming that PÕ + PÕÕ q < 0 to insure the existence of a unique pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in output (Gaudet and Salant, 1991), the fraction dqj /dki of
the second term in (6) is indeed positive and so is the strategic effect. Using
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( = - ¢ - ¢ + i i i i i e q C k q Q P Q P (4)
i
j





q Q P e q C
dk
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) ( ) ( ¢ - - = -
p
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p
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7 Note that we are in a case of accommodation of entry rather than entry deterrence.
8 Note that if we let the production cost be c q the total marginal production cost will still
be constant and equal to c + J.
Fudenberg and TiroleÕs (1984) taxonomy, under these market and regulatory
structures where products are strategic substitutes, firmÕs optimal strategy is
to behave as a Òtop dogÓ and overinvest in R&D.7
B. Taxes
Under tax regulation and Cournot competition, for any given level of ki
and kj, firm i maximizes profits
where J is a fixed tax that firm i must pay for each unit of emission. The
second-period equilibrium is given by the FOCs for ei and qi
Equation (8) indicates that at the optimum, marginal abatement costs are equal
to the tax level J, which implies that the oligopoly structure of the industry
does not affect the cost-effectiveness property of taxes. Eq. (9) shows that the
environmental regulation rises the marginal cost of production by J, which is
independent of the amount of R&D. The latter is because the firm
simultaneously adjusts qi and ei for (8) to always hold.
According to (9) then the optimal qi is independent of ki and kj, which in
turn implies that qj will be independent of ki and kj as well. The reason is that
the marginal cost of production (which here reduces to environmental
compliance only) for both firms is constant at J.8 Therefore, dqj /dki = 0 and
i i i i i i j i i e e q C k q Q P k k t p - - - = ) ( ) ( ) , ( (7)
0 ) ( = - - ¢ t i i i i e q C k (8)
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( = - ¢ + = - ¢ - ¢ + t i i i i i i q Q P Q P e q C k q Q P Q P (9)302 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
the (negative) value of the total derivative of (7) with respect to ki at the
optimum is, from the envelope theorem, equal to
Under tax regulation there is no strategic effect because firm iÕs R&D
investments do not affect its marginal production costs (they do affect total
costs), and consequently, its output.
Let us now compare incentives under taxes and under emission standards.
Equation (10) differs from (6) in some important ways. First, before any
investment in R&D is undertaken (i.e., ki = 1), (4) and (9) indicate that output
levels are the same by regulatory design (tax level J leads to emissions  i e
before R&D). This implies that the direct effect Ci (qi Ð ei) is the same for both
emission standards and taxes. However, under emission standards regulation
there is a positive strategic effect that increases R&D incentives, which is
measured by the second term of (6). Thus, if the R&D function f (°) is such
that only mild innovations take place (optimal k close to 1), R&D is likely to
be higher under emission standards.
Second, at positive levels of R&D (i.e., ki < 1), the direct effect is greater
under taxes because the corresponding abatement level is larger. Re-writing
the output FOCs
we can observe that under tax regulation qi is independent of ki, while under
emission standards qi must increase if ki drops for eq. (11) to continue holding
given that  i e  is fixed and PÕ + PÕÕ q < 0 by assumption. From the latter, we
also have that an increase in qi reduces the LHS of (11) below the LHS of (12).
This implies that the amount of abatement under emission standards, qi Ð  , i e  is
lower than under taxes and so is the direct effect.





) ( ) ( ) ( i i i i i e q C k q Q P Q P - ¢ = ¢ + (11)
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The importance of the strategic effect of emission standards relative to the
direct effect of either taxes or standards depends on the demand curve P(Q)
and  the  emissions  goal      To  see  this  in  a  very  simple  way,  consider  the
following change to the market-regulatory situation: a positive parallel shift
of a linear demand curve from P to a P (a > 1), with PÕ < 0 and PÕÕ = 0
unchanged, and the same tax level J, which necessarily implies a higher
emissions goal E  and emission standards  . i e  Under tax regulation, this new
situation leads to higher output qi (see eq. (9), same abatement qi - ei (see eq.
(8), and hence, higher emissions. Now, the direct effect of either instrument
at any ki remains unchanged because the optimal amount of abatement is not
affected by a.9
And from (6) and PÕÕ = 0, we can see that the strategic effect increases
with q. Thus, by increasing a (and adjusting E accordingly) we can let the
strategic effect of emission standards to be as large as we like without affecting
the direct effect under either instrument. We can summarize the comparison
between taxes and emission standards in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Under Cournot competition in the output market, taxes can
provide more, less, or the same R&D incentives than emission standards.
The R&D ranking between taxes and emission standards will ultimately
depend on the relative importance of the regulatory goal, output demand and
R&D production function f (°). Emission standards are likely to offer greater
R&D incentives when the f (°) and v are such that only minor innovations take
place, and when output demand is large and/or more inelastic for the strategic
effects to be more important. On the other hand, taxes are likely to provide
more incentives at stricter regulatory levels (higher J and lower e) because
9 In the case of taxes is immediate since J has not changed. In the case of emission standards
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direct effects become relatively more important. We shall illustrate these results
with the aid of numerical examples.
C. Permits
Because grandfathered tradable permits and auctioned permits are very
closely related, I shall merge their analysis into one but emphasizing their
differences as they arise. Thus, under ÒpermitsÓ regulation and Cournot
competition, for any given level of ki and kj, firm i maximizes profits
) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( i i i i i i i j i i e e q C k q Q P k k e s p - - - - =
where gi is amount of (tradable) permits received by firm i and F is the market
clearing price of permits after a total of E permits are distributed gratis by
the regulator. If instead, the E permits are auctioned off, gi = 0 and both
firms become buyers of permits. The auction clearing price is the same as in
the permits market because there are no income effects.
Since the permits market (or auction market) operates first, we start by
solving the third-period output equilibrium. Firm i takes ei as given, which is
the number of permits withheld in the second period, and maximizes
). ( ) ( i i i i i e q C k q Q P - -  The FOC is
Letting  ) ( ö i i e q be the solution to the third-period output equilibrium, in the
second  period  firm  i  chooses ei to maximize
). ( ) ) ( ö ( ) ( ö ) ( i i i i i i i i i e e e q C k e q Q P e s - - - -  Using the envelope theorem, the Nash bargaining
equilibrium in the permits market is given by (Spulber, 1989),10
(13)
0 ) ( ) ( = - ¢ - ¢ + i i i i i e q C k q P Q P (14)
) ( ) ) ( ö ( ) ( ö ) ( i i i i i i i i i e e e q C k e q Q P e s - - - -
10 Firms bargain over F until no further exchange of permits is mutually beneficial while
taking into account their correct expectation of future outputs  i q ö and  . ö j q305 MARKET STRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATION
Thus, the (negative) value of the total derivative of (13) with respect to ki
at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the permits and output markets is
The first term on the RHS of (17) is the direct effect, the second term is the
strategic effect from the output market and the third term is the strategic effect
from the permits market. While the sign of the direct effect is clearly positive,
the sign of other two effects is not so immediate.
In a permits-Cournot game, environmental R&D cannot readily be
interpreted as pure cost-reducing innovation because there is an interaction
in the permits market. Hence, dqj /dki may no longer be positive as it was
under standards. In fact, we have that (see Appendix B)
which is negative, since PÕ + PÕÕ q < 0 by assumption. The implication is that
a lower ki, which means lower marginal abatement costs ki CiÕ, reduces firm
jÕs relative costs, increasing its output. The explanation is that any R&D
investment made by firm i Òspills overÓ through the permits market, lowering
the price F and consequently reducing abatement costs for both firms in the
same amount at the margin, which ultimately helps firm j to increase output.
Investments in R&D also affect the permits market. As formally
demonstrated in Appendix B, the total effect of R&D on the permits price is
negative (i.e., dF /dki > 0), regardless of who invest in R&D; otherwise firmsÕ
production would be lower after R&D since marginal production costs are
(15) s = - ¢ = - ¢ ) ) ( ö ( ) ) ( ö ( j j j j j i i i i i e e q C k e e q C k
E e e j i = + (16)
(17) ) ( ) ( i i
i i
j
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equal to F (see (14)). The sign of this strategic effect from the permits market
depends on whether the firm i is a seller or buyer of permits. If the firm is a
buyer of permits (ei > gi), this effect is positive because the firm now buys
permits at a lower price.
Thus, the total derivative (17) becomes
) 2 3 ( 2
) ( ) 2 3 (
) (
C k q P P




¢ ¢ - ¢ ¢ + ¢
- ¢ ¢ + ¢ ¢ - ¢ ¢
- - = -
e p
While the strategic effect from the output market is always negative for either
tradable permits or auctioned permits, the strategic effect from the permits
market is zero under tradable permits (e = g) and positive under auctioned
permits (g = 0). Therefore, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Under Cournot competition in the output market and imperfect
competition in the permits market, a buyer of permits has greater R&D
incentives than a seller of permits, and consequently, auctioned permits lead
to more R&D than grandfathered permits.
In terms of the Fudenberg and TiroleÕs (1984) taxonomy, eq. (19) indicates
that when products are strategic substitutes and firms are under tradable permits
regulation, it is optimal to follow a Òlean and hungry lookÓ strategy and
underinvest in R&D. If firms are under auctioned permits regulation, it may
be optimal to follow a Òtop dogÓ strategy and overinvest in R&D.
The comparison between tradable permits and the other two regulatory
instruments, emission standards and taxes, is rather straightforward. At any
value of k, direct effects under tradable permits and standards are the same
and lower than direct effects under taxes (unless k = 1 in which case are
equal). Since strategic effects under tradable permits are always negative, it
follows:
Proposition 3: Under Cournot competition in the output market and imperfect
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competition in the permits market, tradable permits offer less R&D incentives
than either emission standards or taxes.
The comparison between auctioned permits and emission standards and
taxes is more involved. At any value of k, direct effects under auctioned
permits and standards are the same and lower than direct effects under taxes
(unless k = 1 in which case they are equal). On the other hand, strategic
effects from the permits market can be large enough for total effects to be
higher than total effects under standards and taxes, as we shall see in the
numerical section. Thus, we can establish:
Proposition 4: Under Cournot competition in the output market and imperfect
competition in the permits market, auctioned permits can offer more, less, or
the same R&D incentives than either emission standards or taxes.
Results so far are based on the assumption of firms engaged in quantity
competition for the output market. As Fundenberg and Tirole (1984) and
Tirole (1988) have already shown, the sign of the strategic effect may change
as firms engage in price competition for the output market. As we shall see
below, this does not necessarily mean that previous propositions simply revert
under price competition. There are regulatory interactions that must be taken
into account as well.
IV. R&D under Bertrand Competition
In this section, I repeat the previous analysis but assuming instead that
firms compete  la Bertrand with differentiated products. The demand curve
faced by firm i is  ), , ( j i i i p p D q º  where (i)  0 > ¶ ¶ ³ ¶ ¶ - j i i i p D p D  and (ii)
. 0 /
2 > ¶ ¶ ¶ j i i p p D  Because products are not necessarily homogenous (i) simply
indicates that a firmÕs price change has an equal or larger effect on its own
demand than on its rivalÕs. On the other hand, (ii) says that a firmÕs price
increase has a smaller effect on its own demand the larger the price of its308 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
(21)
rival. I also assume that Di(pi, pj )  is not too convex in pi; otherwise second
order conditions (SOCs) do not hold. To avoid cluster I will sometimes use
the following notation:  , / 1 i i p D D ¶ ¶ º ¢ , / 2 j i p D D ¶ ¶ º ¢ i i i p p D D ¶ ¶ ¶ º ¢ /
2
11  and
j i i p p D D D ¶ ¶ ¶ º ¢ ¢ = ¢ ¢ /
2
21 12 (the same notation applies if we interchange i by
j). Note that even if products are homogenous, i.e.,  , 2 1 D D ¢ = ¢ - the competitive
outcome, i.e., p = k CÕ, is not obtained because the emissions cap E acts as a
capacity constraint.11
A. Emission Standards
Under emission standards regulation and Bertrand competition, for any
given a level of ki and kj, firm i maximizes profits
so the FOC for pi is
and the (negative) value of total derivative of (20) at the optimum level of
prices is
Because MDi /Mpj > 0 and pi > ki CiÕ (capacity constraints allow firm i to
exercise some market power even if product are homogenous), the sign of the
strategic effect depends on dpj /dki (see Appendix C for its derivation). Plugging
dpj /dki into (22) we obtain for symmetric firms
11 See Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).
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where
and
SOCs for a local maximum require that A < 0 and Aý - Bý > 0 (see Appendix
C), so, as in the Cournot game, dpj /dki > 0. Thus, (23) indicates that in this
market structure where products are strategic complements, firmÕs optimal
strategy is to behave as a Òpuppy dogÓ and underinvest in R&D.
B. Taxes
Under tax regulation and Bertrand competition, for any given level of ki
and kj, firm i maximizes profits
i i j i i i j i i i j i i e e p p D C k p p D p k k t p - - - = ) ) , ( ( ) , ( ) , (
The FOCs for ei and pi are, respectively
Expression (26) indicates that pi and pj are not affected by the choice of ki
and kj, so the total derivative of (24) at the equilibrium is given by
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As before, under tax regulation there is no strategic effect because firm iÕs
R&D investments do not affect its marginal production costs, and consequently,
its output.
Now, we can compare R&D incentives under taxes and emission standards,
given by eqs. (27) and (23) respectively, when firms play a Bertrand game in
the output market. Before any investment in R&D is undertaken (i.e., k = 1),
(26) and (21) indicate that output levels are the same by regulatory design (J
leads to emissions  ). e  This implies that the direct effect C(q - e) is the same
for both emission standards and taxes. However, under emission standards
regulation there is a negative strategic effect that reduces R&D incentives,
which is measured by the second term of (23). Similarly, at positive levels of
R&D (i.e., k < 1), the direct effect is greater under taxes because the
corresponding abatement level is larger. Since strategic effects continue to
be negative for emission standards, it immediately follows the next
proposition:
Proposition 5: Under Bertrand competition in the output market, taxes offer
more R&D incentives than emission standards.
C. Permits
As before, the analysis of grandfathered tradable permits and auctioned
permits are merged into one. Under permits regulation and Bertrand
competition, for any given level of ki and kj, firm i maximizes profits
where gi is the amount of (tradable) permits received by firm i and F is the
market clearing price of permits after a total of E permits are distributed
gratis by the regulator. If instead, the E permits are auctioned off, gi  = 0 and
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both firms are buyers of permits. Again, the auction clearing price remains
the same as in the permits market because there are no income effects.
Since the permits market (or auction market) operates first, we start by
solving the third-period output equilibrium. Firm i takes ei as given, which is
the amount of permits withheld in the second-period, and maximizes piDi - kiCi
with respect to pi. The FOC is
Letting   ) ( ö ö i i i e p p º  be  the  solution  to  the  third-period  price
equilibrium, in the second period firm i chooses ei to maximize
). ( ) ) ö , ö ( ( ) ö , ö ( ö i i i j i i i i j i i i e e p p D C k p p D p e s - - - -  Using the envelope
theorem, the Nash bargaining equilibrium in the permits market is given by
(Spulber, 1989),12
Thus, the (negative) value of the total derivative of (28) with respect to ki
at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the permits and output market is
where the second term of the RHS of (32) is the strategic effect from the
output market, and the third term is the strategic effect from the permits market.
Since  i i i C k p ¢ >  and MDi /Mpj > 0, the sign of the strategic effect from the
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where A and B are as in section IV.A. Since SOCs require that A + B < 0 (see
Appendix C), we also have that dpj /dki > 0. In this permits-Bertrand game,
firm iÕs R&D (i.e., lower k) leads firm j to reduce its action pj, and hence
increase its profits, not only because of output complementarity but also
because any R&D investment Òspills overÓ through the permits market
reducing abatement costs for both firms in the same amount at the margin.
Because of this latter effect, it is not difficult to show that dpj /dki under permits
is always greater than under emission standards. Formally, this is the case
because A + B < 0.
The sign of the strategic effect in the permits market depends on the sign
of  dF /dki  and  on whether the firm i is a seller or buyer of permits. Since
dF /dki > 0 (see Appendix D for its derivation),13 when a firm is a buyer of
permits (ei > gi), the strategic effect from the permits market is positive.
Accounting for strategic effects in both permits and output markets, the total
derivative (32) becomes
















13 The value of dF /dki is unambiguously positive when either products are homogeneous
(i.e., DÕ1 + DÕ2 = 0) or the demand curve is linear (i.e., DÕ11 = DÕ12 = 0). If products are too
differentiated (i.e.,  DÕ1 + DÕ2 << 0) and the demand curve is very convex (i.e., DÕÕ11 >> 0),
dF /dki may become negative. However, we do not discuss this possibility further here in
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that when products are strategic complements, under tradable permits
regulation (i.e., e = g) it is optimal for a firm to follow a Òpuppy dogÓ strategy
and underinvest in R&D. Under auctioned permits regulation (i.e., g  = 0), on
the other hand, it may be optimal for a firm to follow a Òfat catÓ strategy and
overinvest in R&D.
We now can proceed to compare permits with emission standards and
taxes. Comparing R&D incentives under tradable permits (e = g) and emission
standards only requires to compare dpj /dki since direct effects are the same
for both instruments at any value of k. Consequently, we have the following
proposition:
Proposition 6: Under Bertrand competition in the output market and imperfect
competition in the permits market, tradable permits offer less R&D incentives
than emission standards.
Comparing auctioned permits and taxes (see eq. (27)) follows directly
from the discussion between taxes and emission standards of Section III.B.
Before R&D (i.e., ki = 1), direct effects are the same by regulatory design. At
positive levels of R&D (i.e., ki < 1), however, direct effects are larger under
taxes while strategic effects may be positive under auctioned permits. For
instance, if we reduce D2' sufficiently enough so that the strategic effect from
the output market under auctioned permits decreases, -dB /dk can become
greater under auctioned permits than under taxes. On the other hand, if we
make the regulatory goal stricter (i.e., e is only a small fraction of q) so that
the direct effect under both instruments increases, -dB /dk can become greater
under taxes than under auctioned permits. Therefore, we can establish the
following proposition:
Proposition 7: Under Bertrand competition in the output market and imperfect
competition in the permits market, auctioned permits can offer more, less or
the same R&D incentives than taxes.314 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
V. Some Numerical Examples
In this section, I develop some numerical examples to illustrate and
complement some of the analytical results shown in the previous sections.
The examples are not randomly selected, but rather to emphasize differences
between direct and strategic effects.
A. Cournot Examples
Let P(Q) = a - bQ be the demand curve and C(q Ð e) = (q Ð e)2 be abatement
costs  before R&D, where Q = 2 q. Let k = (1 Ð g) e-KT + g be the R&D
production function, where 0 < g < 1, KT  = (1 + 2) K, and K is the amount of
R&D effort by each firm in the equilibrium.14The market and regulatory
parameters are chosen to yield a significant amount of emissions abatement.
To simplify matters, the regulatory design is such that before R&D, marginal
abatement costs are equal to some marginal harm h.
In the first example, Ex. 1, I use the following parameters: a = 16, b = 0.2,
g  = 0.4, v = 5 and  h = 10. Results in this and following examples are at the
firm level. The first row of Table 1 (ÒBefore R&DÓ) shows market and
regulatory characteristics before R&D takes place. The regulatory design
imposes a significant reduction, q - e, upon firms of 50%, which is achieved
by either levying a tax J = 10, issuing a total number of permits E = 10, which
leads to F = 10, or setting emission standards e = 5 for each firm. Note that
the reason for the output price P(Q) to be close to marginal costs is because
the large price elasticity (-3 at the market equilibrium), which will make
strategic effects to be relatively less important than direct effects. FirmÕs optimal
R&D efforts, K, for three levels of R&D spillovers (2 = 0, 0.5, and 1) and
under each of the regulatory regimes (E. ST., TAX, T. P., and A. P.) are shown
in the next 4 rows.15 R&D investments are larger under taxes (TAX) than
14 Optimal K under each regulatory regime is obtained from (2) and either (6), (10) or (19).
15 Note that market and environmental outcomes are not affected by 2. This is because
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under emission standards (E. ST.) and auctioned permits (A. P.) because direct
effects are more important. The parameters of the example were chosen that it
is possible to have no investment under tradable permits (T. P.).
Table 1. R&D under Cournot Competition
K
q = 0 q = 0.5 q = 1
1 Before R&D 10 10 12 5 1 --- --- ---
E. ST. n.a. 11.35 11.46 5 0.72 0.62 0.41 0.31
TAX 10 10 12 1.5 0.59 1.16 0.77 0.58
T. P. 10 10 12 5 1 0 0 0
A. P. 9.15 11.42 11.43 5 0.71 0.65 0.44 0.33
2 Before R&D 10 20 14 15 1 --- --- ---
E. ST. n.a. 20.74 13.70 15 0.83 0.33 0.22 0.16
TAX 10 20 14 12.75 0.69 0.73 0.49 0.37
T. P. 10 20 14 15 1 0 0 0
A. P. 8.81 21.99 13.21 15 0.63 0.96 0.64 0.48
3 Before R&D 10 10 60 5 1 --- --- ---
E. ST. n.a. 10.18 58.16 5 0.70 0.70 0.47 0.35
TAX 10 10 60 3.18 0.73 0.59 0.39 0.30
T. P. 10 10 60 5 1 0 0 0
A. P. 8.79 10.08 59.20 5 0.87 0.25 0.17 0.13
In Ex. 2, I let the demand curve to increase to a = 22, which significantly
reduces the regulatory requirements to 25%. I also increase v from 5 to 5.6 to
ensure that emissions are positive for all values of 2. This drop in the regulatory
goal makes direct effect relatively less important, which leads to higher R&D
Ex. Scenario t, s q P e k316 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
under auctioned permits than under standards and taxes. Finally, in Ex. 3, I
keep the 50% regulatory goal of Ex. 1 and make the demand curve more
inelastic setting a = 160 and b = 5.16 Strategic effects from the output market
are now much more important than direct effects, which leads to higher R&D
under standards than under taxes and auctioned permits.
B. Bertrand Examples
In the following examples, I continue using a linear demand curve and let
, ) , ( j i i j i i p c p b a q p p D + - = º where  . 2 1 D c b D ¢ º ³ º ¢ - 17 Cost and R&D
production functions remain the same. In the first example of Table 2, Ex. 1,
I  consider homogenous products and use the following parameters: a = 10,
b = 0.5, c = 0.5, g = 0.4, v = 5.6 and h = 10. With these parameters, the
amount of reduction is significant and equal to 50%, as shown in the first
row of Table 2 under ÒBefore R&D.Ó In this example (negative) strategic
effects from the output market are large enough for taxes to lead to more
R&D than auctioned permits.
In Ex. 2, I reduce the regulatory goal to 25% and use the following
parameters values: a = 20, b = c = 1, ( = 0.4, v = 5.4. Because both direct
effects and (negative) strategic effects from the output market decrease with
these new values, auctioned permits lead to more R&D than taxes.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have compared a firmÕs incentives to invest in environmental
R&D under different market structures and environmental policy instruments.
Because of market strategic effects, R&D incentives are found to vary widely
16 I also increase v to 5.7 for the same reasons above.
17 As before, optimal K under each regulatory regime is obtained from (2) and either (23),
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Table 2. R&D under Bertrand Competition
K
q = 0 q = 0.5 q = 1
1 Before R&D 10 10 10 5 1 --- --- ---
E. ST. n.a. 10 10 5 1 0 0 0
TAX 10 10 10 2.75 0.69 0.73 0.49 0.37
T. P. 10 10 10 5 1 0 0 0
A. P. 7.87 10 12.13 5 0.79 0.44 0.29 0.21
2 Before R&D 10 20 10 15 1 --- --- ---
E. ST. n.a. 20 10.04 15 1.00 0.01 0.01 0
TAX 10 20 10 12.21 0.64 0.91 0.61 0.45
T. P. 9.96 20 10.04 15 1.00 0.01 0 0
A. P. 6.32 20 13.68 15 0.63 0.95 0.63 0.46
across market structures and instruments. In particular, I found that when
firmsÕ products are strategic substitutes (i.e., Cournot), either emission
standards, taxes or auctioned permits can provide the most incentives. But
when firmsÕ products are strategic complements (i.e., Bertrand), either taxes
or auctioned permits can provide the most incentives.
A natural question that remains is how the results of the paper change as
markets become more competitive. To answer this question, we can simply
extend the model from two to a large number of firms competing  la Cournot.
Strategic effects no longer matter, so we need only concentrate on direct effects,
or more precisely, on abatement levels levels qi Ð ei. Before R&D (i.e., k = 1),
direct effects are the same for all instruments by regulatory design. By the
same arguments laid out in the paper (see Section III.B for example), at positive
levels of R&D (i.e., k < 1), however, direct effects are higher under taxes than
under permits and emission standards because abatement is higher.
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Consequently, under perfect competition, tradable permits, auctioned permits
and emission standards lead to the same amount of R&D but lower than taxes.
Additional to the above finding is that under perfect competition R&D
incentives are not affected by the way the permits are initially distributed
among firms, and that is why incentives under grandfathered permits and
auctioned permits are the same. This is in sharp contrast with previous literature
(e.g., Milliman and Prince, 1989; and Jung et al, 1996), where authors fail to
distinguish between cost savings (including permits payments) and innovation
incentives. The reason is that for any given output price P and permits price
F, the effect of a change in k on the profits B of a price-taking firm does not
depend on the distribution of permits g. Even output q is not affected by
changes in k, because at the margin the additional production cost from the
regulation continues to be F.
There are a few extensions to the model that may be worth exploring. One
extension would be to consider a different technology innovation process. It
could be modeled as a patent race where R&D firms (other than production
firms) compete for the invention of a more efficient technology to be sold to
producing firms either because lowers production costs or because the
regulator imposes firms to adopt the new technology. Note that this has already
been done for the case of perfect competition in the output market (Biglaiser
and Horowitz, 1995). Another interesting extension would be to consider ex-
ante asymmetries among firms. Firms will often have different costs of
production and costs to conduct R&D either because of size (economies of
scale) or past experience. Firms may also have different costs to adopt new
technologies because of previous investments or commitments like long-term
contracts.
Appendix A
Under Cournot competition and emission standards regulation, the first
order conditions for firms i and j are given by (4). Taking total derivative with
respect to ki at the Nash equilibrium in both FOCs we obtain319 MARKET STRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATION











































 Then, subtracting (A2) from (A1) and rearranging (A2), we obtain the
system of equations that by symmetry reduces to
which leads to
This is the fraction of the last term in (6) in the text.
Appendix B
Under Cournot competition and permits regulation, the equilibrium
conditions in the permits and output markets for firms i and j are given by
(14), (15) and (16). Taking total derivative with respect to ki in these FOCs
(eq. (14) is used twice for both i and j)
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and replacing (B5) into (B1) and (B6) into (B2), to become (B1') and (B2'),
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Then, to find dqj /dki, we replace (B5)-(B7) into either (B1) or (B2) to
obtain
and to find dF /dki, we replace (B5)-(B8) into (B3) to obtain
Appendix C
Under Bertrand competition (regardless of whether products are
homogeneous or differentiated) and emission standards regulation, the first
order conditions for firms i and j are given by (21). Taking total derivative
with respect to ki at the Nash equilibrium in both expressions, rearranging,
assuming symmetry and using the simplified notation (see text) gives
where,  ) ) ( ) ( 2 ( 11
2
1 1 D C k p C D k D A ¢ ¢ ¢ - + ¢ ¢ ¢ - ¢ =
and,  ) ) ( ( 12 2 1 2 D C k p C D D k D B ¢ ¢ ¢ - + ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ - ¢ =
Second order conditions (SOCs) for a local maximum require that A < 0 and
Aý - Bý > 0. Since B > 0, the SOCs also imply that A + B < 0.
Subtracting (C2) from (C1) and rearranging, we obtain
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which is positive since  0 1 < ¢ D and  . 0 12 > ¢ ¢ D This is part of the last term in (23)
in the text. Note that if the demand curve D(pi ,pj) is linear (i.e.,  ) 0 11 12 = ¢ ¢ = ¢ ¢ D D it
is immediate that A < 0, B > 0, A + B < 0 and dpj /dki > 0.
Appendix D
Under Bertrand competition (regardless of whether products are
homogeneous or differentiated) and permits regulation, the equilibrium
conditions in the permits and output markets for firms i and j are given by
(29), (30) and (31). Taking total derivative with respect to ki in all four






































































































































































































and replacing (D5) into (D1) and (D6) into (D2), to become (D1') and (D2'),
respectively, and then subtracting (D2') from (D1'), we obtain
Then, to find dpj /dki, we replace (D5) thru (D7) into either (D1) or (D2)
to obtain
which is positive from the second order conditions discussed in Appendix C.
Finally, to find dF /dki, we replace (D5) - (D8) into (D3) to obtain
It is not difficult to demonstrate that this expression is unambiguously positive
when either products are homogeneous (i.e.,  ) 0 2 1 = ¢ + ¢ D D or the demand curve
is linear (i.e.,  ). 0 12 11 = ¢ + ¢ D D
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